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ON AIR POLLUTION CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
by Thomas D. Crocker*
INTRODUCTION
The student asked, "But is this the way of the real world?"
"I don't know," replied the instructor. "I've never been there."
Investigators of complex systems: must be aware of the tension be-
tween abstract validity and every day applicability innocently expressed
by the above student. It is submitted, however, that many writers deal-
ing with the economics of air pollution control instruments have ig-
nored every day applicability for the internal logical consistency of
deductive propositions. When dealing with the student's every day
world these writers too often seem unaware that a price has been paid.
In particular, their failure to account explicitly for the bounded ra-
tionality,2 uncertainty,3 and informational, contractual and policing
(ICP) costs4 inherent in all air pollution problems weakens the appli-
cability of their conclusions about the allocative efficiency properties
of alternative control instruments.5
Attention in this paper will be confined to stationary sources.0 The
assumption is made throughout that human satisfaction or welfare is
* Acting Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, Riverside.
1. The complex system is distinguished by the requirement, particularly in an
investigation's early stages, that drastic and even illegitimate simplifications be made
for purposes of analytical tractability.
2. By bounded rationality is meant the finite limit to the rate at which for a given
expenditure of resources an economic agent is able to assimilate information.
3. Uncertainty refers to the agent's inability to predict future states with zero prob-
ability of error, whether that inability be due to incapacity, excessive costs, or irre-
ducible randomness.
4. Informational cost is the cost of finding out what is going on, contractual costs
are the costs of carrying out any negotiation or agreement, and policing costs involve
seeing that an agreement, once made, is adhered to.
5. In this paper, a control instrument is not an engineering gadget. Instead the
reference is to an economic or legal means of bringing about a change in air pollution
dosages. A rule that requires the installation of dust collectors in certain industrial
processes is a control instrument. The dust collectors are not.
6. Stationary sources are those immobile sources of air pollution which are associated
with industrial, commercial and residential activities. COUNTY OF Los ANoELES,
Am POLLUTION CONTROL DsTncr, PROFILE OF AIR POLLUTiON CONTROL 17 (1971).
While these sources were once responsible for generating more than half of the total
air pollution discharged into the Los Angeles County atmosphere, they now account
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directly related to the minimization of all the costs of air pollution con-
trol: damage costs, abatement costs7 and ICP costs. Accordingly, the
preferred or optimal control instrument is one which minimizes the
sum of these costs.8 To this end, and following an assessment of the
shortcomings of currently favored control instruments, a non-pecuniary
control instrument will be advanced. It will be proposed that the air
pollution control agencies define emission "rights" and sell them on a
competitive bidding basis.
I. CONTROL INSTRUMENTS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED
The wide variety of instruments available to the would-be controller
fall into three general classes:9 bargaining and negotiations, standards,
and charges. Opportunities for direct receptor and emitter' 0 bargain-
ing in air pollution situations appear to be quite limited, however, ex-
cept where small numbers of emitters and receptors are involved."
for only about 10 percent of such pollution. Id. While 10 percent is still a significant
figure, the dramatic percentage reduction in pollution emanating from stationary sources
in Los Angeles is attributable to two factors: the effectiveness of current stationary
source controls and the increase locally in the number of automobiles and their propor-
tionately greater amount of emissions.
7. The damage costs generated by a given quantity of air pollution are identical to
what air pollution sufferers would be willing to pay to be rid of the specified quantity.
Under a quite broad range of conditions, this willingness to pay is identical to the
additional expenditures on health, cleaning, etc., that are caused by air pollution.
While the precise amount of damage costs cannot be calculated, certain repair,
replacement and cleaning costs have been estimated. For example, the costs to paint
steel structures damaged by air pollution are close to $100 million a year. Crop and
livestock damage is estimated at $500 million a year; and dyeing of fabrics soiled
by air pollution is estimated to be $800 million per year. CouNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QuALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 72 (1970).
Similarly, the abatement or control costs of air pollution are what a producer of
waste materials would be willing to pay to use the air as a garbage dump rather than
to employ an alternative means of waste disposal. This willingness is reflected by the
total investment required to control the major industrial and municipal sources of
pollution. The investment necessary through 1975 to control such sources of particular
matter, sulfur oxides, hydrocarbons and carbon monoxides in 100 metropolitan areas
of the United States is estimated at $2.6 billion. Id.
8. These sums would necessarily be weighted rather than simple if distributional
considerations are taken into account.
9. For a listing of various available instruments see Gaffney, Applying Economic
Controls, 21 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTIsTs 20 (1965); Wright, Some Aspects of the
Use of Corrective Taxes for Controlling Air Pollution Emissions, 9 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 63 (1969).
10. The receptor is the air pollution sufferer. The emitter is the producer of waste
materials to which no one finds it worthwhile to lay claim. Air pollution is more or
less unique in that the receptor and the emitter are, in part, embodied in the same
individual.
11. A case in which emitters and receptors did in fact bargain directly is reviewed
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The outlays necessary to bargain directly usually outweigh at least
one party's expected gains, 12 and the bargaining that does occur be-
comes political in nature because attempts are usually made to influ-
ence the decisions of some collective body. As such, this article will
concern itself only with the instruments which these collective bodies
(air pollution control agencies) wield, i.e., "standards" and "charges."
A. Standards
In its various manifestations, the standard has long been the fav-
orite of air pollution control administrators. Local, state and federal
air pollution law is replete with discussion of emission, ambient and
input standards. The favored combination in practice probably consists
of an input standard and an emission standard. The input standard
restricts the production materials and equipment an emitter may -use
while the emission standard limits the quantity of pollutants the emit-
ter may release. This combination is especially well suited to the needs
of the control agency if its prime concern is to minimize the effort re-
quired of it to do a specific job within a given budget. Once agency ap-
proval of equipment and materials specifications is required, agency
prediction of emitter behavior is enhanced. The emission standard
reinforces this predictability by further inhibiting the potential range of
emission variations. Both types of standards are enforced by spot
checks and fines for violations.
Control agencies apparently recognize that the use of the above in-
struments to minimize the sum of damage and control cost is likely to
be an extremely expensive undertaking. They have therefore tended
to allocate the air resource according to ad hoc administrative notions
of fairness and equity. Though by their very nature ad hoc proce-
dures involve some element of arbitrariness,' 3 this factor is lessened by
interminable control agency and emitter haggling about design, financ-
ing, and construction of emitter control facilities. In effect, these ne-
gotiations substitute for costly calculation of optimal standards. - How-
ever, lengthy negotiations consume time, and the result is that in
in Crocker, Externalities, Property Rights, and Transaction Costs: An Empirical Study,
14 J. LAw & EcoN. 451 (1971).
12. For a review of some of the difficulties associated with the bargaining
approach see Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and Government-Assisted Invisible
Hand, 31 ECONOmICA 345 (1964).
13. This arbitrariness derives as the result of the varying criteria by which emitter
and receptor situations are evaluated. The lack of a definite standard opens the door
to capricious and arbitrary determinations.
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rapidly changing situations ambient air quality often actually falls.
When action is finally taken it sometimes proves to be a response to
an environment that no longer exists. In the interim, variances to the
presumed control regulations are allowed to proliferate since the willing-
ness of air pollution jurisdictions to grant variances is often a function
of more than the evaluative and regulatory lags inherent in the use
of input and emission standards. Meanwhile the public, believing
something is being accomplished, is too often lulled into quiescence.14
This public state of mind can readily be maintained if the agency
wishes, since most control agencies are given the authority both to
report and to control results.15
Relative to emitters, the number of receptors is usually large and their
interests diffuse.' While the control agency must deal with the emit-
ters on a more or less continuing basis since they are the objects of
regulation, direction from receptors and their elected representatives is
little more than intermittent. This direction is often cursory because of
the air pollution problem's technical nature. Finally, a count of offi-
cials responsible only for air pollution control would likely find a sub-
stantial proportion of them to be engineers intimately versed in the
technicalities of emission control. Causal empiricism suggests that a
knowledge of a problem's intricacies often results in individual sensitiv-
ity to technical errors and thus causes one to proceed cautiously in
discrete and carefully ordered steps. The major form of caution ex-
ercised by control officials in assessing and preventing damage to recep-
tor interests seems to consist of caveats against proceeding too fast
with stringent emitter controls because of the lack of laboratory con-
trolled experimental knowledge about damages. Therefore, if the hy-
pothesis is correct, this cautionary behavior will more likely be exer-
cised on behalf of emitters rather than receptors.
14. The recent spate of private suits to compel public enforcement of public environ-
mental law might imply the termination of this trust in the performance of the regula-
tory authorities. For a review of these legal actions see Grad & Rockett, Environmental
Litigation-Where the Action Is?, 10 NAT. REsouRCEs J. 752 (1970).
15. Comparisons of ambient air pollutant concentrations over time or space
are utterly fruitless unless the sampling procedures and conditions are fully specified.
For an interesting review of the many pitfalls see Schneider, Sampling Problems in
Air Pollution Analysis, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 452 (1970).
16. A small number of emitters seem to contribute the preponderance of the air
pollution from stationary sources in the nation's large cities. See Mason, et al.,
Sources and Air Pollutant Emission Patterns in Major Metropolitan Areas, a paper
presented at the Air Pollution Control Association Annual Meeting, New York (June
22-26, 1969), where the authors find that in twenty-eight selected large cities, forty-
eight percent of the suspended particulates and sixty-seven percent of the sulfur oxides
are contributed by the ten largest point sources.
1972] 283
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The agency's typical choice of standards as control instruments can
generate yet another factor working against receptor interests. As ear-
lier noted, the establishment or at least the enforcement of these stand-
ards involves agency-emitter negotiations. Since the number of par-
ties involved in these negotiations is frequently small, there appears
little basis for expecting an outcome in which the agency and the
emitters act as price-takers. The most probable outcome of such deal-
ings is an arrangement which has at least some of the features of what the
economist calls a collusive bilateral monopoly.17  Since collusion be-
tween the regulated and the regulator is a much noted phenomenon,18
there is no particular reason to expect air pollution control agencies to
be exempt from such collusion. Thus, emitter ICP costs in bargaining
with control agencies are very likely to be less than the ICP costs of
receptors. 19
B. Charges
Most of the above points concerning standards are well known.
What many economists would substitute for standards is the effluent
charge,20 an explicit price to be imposed upon the emitter for the use
of the atmosphere. 2' This charge would be set at a designated level
(hereinafter referred to as "the optimum") identified with minimization
of the sum of emitter control costs and receptor damage costs. As so
17. This structure describes a situation involving only one producer of a particular
good (the "monopolist") and only one supplier of an input with which to produce
that good (the "monopsonist"). If they agree to combine against the rest of the
world, it can be shown that they will increase their joint returns. See Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 3 (1971),
wherein the author sets forth an economic-theoretic basis for, and empirical evidence
of, collusion between the regulator and the regulated.
18. Id.
19. Additional items are readily added to this listing of emitter advantages. For
example, the emitter's greater frequency of communication with control officials prob-
ably gives him greater insight into their thinking. He thus has an informational
advantage in predicting the agency's next move. Furthermore, information is a highly
valued input for the control official. Generally, the emitter can more easily provide
solidly based technical information. Perhaps all these points are intuitively made
clear when one envisions the control official asking himself, "What are the conse-
quences for me if I fail to permit these emissions?" If the emitter can confer benefits
upon the agency, the emitter can impose costs by withholding these potential benefits.
20. Pigou first suggested the charge. A. Picou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-
195 (4th ed. 1932).
21. The applicability of the charge to water pollution problems has also been
endorsed. A. KNEESE, THre ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT
(1964).
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constituted, the charge has been defended as the economically preferable
control instrument in air pollution.22
The economic problem in air pollution control thus becomes one of
discovering the instrument that best minimizes the cost of achieving
and maintaining this optimum. The adherents of the effluent charge
cite two types of advantages for the charge when compared to the in-
put or emission standard. First, they correctly argue that the charge
economizes the costs of calculations and flows of information neces-
sary for the initial discovery of the optimum pollution level. Second,
they also view the charge as being superior in terms of its ability to
maintain this optimum. That is, once it is established, the optimal
effluent charge is thought to have superior incentive properties. Both
of these arguments will be considered later. It will be concluded, how-
ever, that the informational requirements and incentive properties of
the two instrument types are quite similar.
"1. INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The construction of an optimal ad valorem effluent charge requires
knowledge only of the damages caused by an emitter whereas an op-
timal emissions standard requires knowledge of both the emitter's con-
trol costs and the damages he causes. Accordingly, the effluent charge
requires less information. 23 Implicit in this argument, however, is the
assumption of a world of perfect certainty, a world in which no dis-
crepancy between outcomes predicted by the control agency and those
which are realized ever occurs. The control agency is presumed capable
of effecting a hypothetical outcome in a world where receptors and
emitters make production and consumption plans from which they will
never deviate. In this context the control agency would merely be
required to make itself aware of these once-and-for-all plans and then
produce those adjustments that increase the net value of receptor and
emitter output. Additional adjustments would then never be required.
Such pervasive intelligence boggles the mind.
If the omniscience, clairvoyance or budget of the control agency
22. Mills, Economic Incentives in Air-Pollution Control, in THE ECONOMICS OF
Am POLLUTION 40 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
23. Since an optimal input standard would require knowledge of damage costs and
the costs of the input combinations and the control techniques associated with the
various emitter production processes, optimal input standards would always require as
much information as optimal emission standards. We will therefore disregard input
standards when viewing the optimum in terms of the minimization of the sum of dam-
age and control costs.
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is regarded as being something less than infinite, it is likely that the
agency will at times have to vary its requirements in order to maintain
the optimum. For example, a new yardstick would be indicated if the
effects of a particular emission were shown to be more (or less)
damaging than had been calculated. However, when variation of any
sort is permitted in the effluent charge or standards, the issue becomes
not one of each instrument's initial informational requirements but the
amount and nature of the information each instrument generates. If
each instrument generates similar information, then either an optimal
charge or optimal emission standard could be calculated. The issue
of initial informational requirements accordingly becomes utterly
irrelevant. The difference between a price (charge) and a command
(standard) is, from the agency's viewpoint, only one of form rather
than one of substance.2 4 While the emitters directly and explicitly
communicate their control costs to the agency in the case of the
emission standard, the emitters indirectly communicate their costs in
the case of the charge by varying their emissions in response to varia-
tions in the charge. In the latter case, the revelation of control costs
is implicit in emitter profit or utility maximization which dictates that
emissions will cease when the charge exceeds the costs of alternative
means of waste disposal.
Notwithstanding that emissions standards and effluent charges are
informationally equivalent, relevant informational issues still exist. Each
instrument's informational requirements are equivalent in their enormity
when one insists upon defining the optimum in terms of the small-
est possible sum of damage and control costs. When an air pollu-
tion situation calls for a possible change in a standard or charge each
variation requires: (1) the collection and transmission of data; (2)
a means of transforming the data into a form suitable for analysis; (3)
the actual analysis of the data; (4) the communication of the magni-
tude of the change in the control instrument to emitters and receptors;
(5) the observation of the receptor and emitter actions taken in re-
sponse to the instrument's changed magnitude; and finally, (6) the
evaluation of these responses. The larger the number of emitters
and receptors and the more intricate and specialized their consump-
tion and production processes, the greater will be the costs of dis-
covering and bringing about the change. The allocation procedures
would rest upon a continuing and enormous flow of data, much of
24. Marglin, Information in Price and Command Systems of Planning, in PUBLIC
EcoNozmcs 54-77 (1. Margolis & H. Guitton eds. 1969).
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which would be superfluous and often of doubtful reliability due to
the fact that most of the information would deal only with past emitter
and receptor performance. A control agency decision made today
should attempt to govern only what happens tomorrow, not yester-
day. That is, to speak of governing or directing emitter and receptor
conduct today by decisions that will be made tomorrow is to speak in
futility.
Economists have recognized a number of factors greatly compli-
cating the calculation of a charge or standard which minimizes the sum
of damage and control costs. Two important complications occur in
a multiple emitter context where aggregate receptor damages do not
increase at a constant rate with increases in ambient pollution concen-
trations and where ambient concentration is not the simple sum of
all emissions.25 When damages do not increase at a constant rate with
pollution concentrations, each emitter's contribution to damages is de-
pendent not only on his own emissions but also on the emissions of
every other emitter. Thus, a change in the emissions of any one
emitter can affect the damage contributions of all other emitters even
though the emissions of the latter have remained constant. Should one
emitter change his emissions, the damage contributions of all other
emitters would have to be recalculated. A similar problem arises when-
ever individual emissions are synergistic. The contribution of one
emitter to the ambient air pollutant concentration is in part based on
the contribution of a second emitter. However, the contribution of the
second emitter is also based in part on the contribution of the first
emitter. Once again the contributions of each emitter would have to
be recalculated each time a single emission change occurred. Given
the lack of any evidence whatsoever that damages change at a constant
rate and further given the well known synergistic properties of many
air pollutants, there is no question that optimal charges or standards
would actually require some complex calculations.
Additional information is required for the standard or charge which
minimizes the sum of damage and control costs when the emitter is
the possessor of a monopolistic advantage. Buchanan
26 and Wellisz 27
25. See Davis & Whinston, Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games, 70
J. POL. ECON. 241 (1962), wherein the authors note (for the first time) these two
problems (technically termed nonlinearity and nonadditivity) in a multiple emitter
context.
26. Buchanan, External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure, 59
AM. ECON. Ruv. 174 (1969).
27. Wellisz, supra note 12, at 349.
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have shown that when the emissions and level of output of a monopolist
are directly related, the loss in social value to the receptor of the
monopolist's output following the imposition of emission controls may
outweigh the receptor's concomitant gain in air quality.
Further informational problems arise if the unit cost of emission
control declines as the size of control facilities increases. There may
then appear to be many optimal emission levels. When the charge or
standard is calculated by taking the number of emitters as a constant,
opportunities for obtaining lower control costs may be foregone by
failing to consider the possible control cost reductions occurring when
several emitters are merged to employ common control or production
facilities. Accordingly, the control cost consequences of a hypotheti-
cal emitter merger must be determined. 28  A calculation of the effects
of this merger upon the extent of competition in emitter output and
input markets would also be required.
The informational problem can be made even more severe by in-
troducing locational considerations. Air pollution differs across space
as well as across time. It therefore follows, given the receptors' dis-
like of air pollution, that they will sort themselves out according to their
relative dislikes and according to the air pollution dosages to which
they expect to be subject at each location and point in time. Locations
will thus differ in market price to correspond with the air pollution
dosages that the locations are expected to receive.29  Disregarding
moving costs, whenever the pattern of expected dosages or damages is
changed, a new spatial arrangement will result. Therefore, a change
in receptor locations can be induced to the extent that a charge or
standard implies a change in dosages or damages. This change in
location can in turn lead to a further change in damages since the
charge or standard might require adjustment to conform with the new
damage relations. Accordingly, unless the control agency can predict
emitter and receptor locational decisions, there are likely to be as many
optimal effluent charges and standards possible as there are combina-
tions of emitter and receptor locations.
TIT. COSTS AND INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY
The informational difficulties inherent in control agency attempts
28. Davis & Whinston, On Externalities, Information, and the Government-As-
sisted Invisible Hand, 33 ECONoMICA 303, 312 (1966).
29. For some empirical evidence that air pollution does in fact contribute to price
differences among locations see Anderson & Crocker, Air Pollution and Residential
Property Values, 8 URBAN STunims 171 (1971).
[Vol. 5
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
to apply optimal effluent charges or emission standards explain why
control agencies commonly find it worthwhile to resort to those ad
hoc emission and input standards arising from the agencies' direct and in-
direct negotiations with emitters and, to a lesser extent, with receptors.
However, there is no apparent reason why emitters or receptors
would choose negotiations with the agency in preference to the
agency's ludicrous attempts to calculate an optimal charge or standard.
Either approach produces substantial uncertainty about emission levels
and the extent of damages. Uncertainty is costly. It exerts an in-
fluence upon incentives and therefore affects the way individuals be-
have. Thus, a discussion of control instruments which purports to be
a serious evaluation of real alternatives cannot avoid the presence of
uncertainty.
30
Consider the receptor. It may be that he is risk averse in that he
attaches a cost to an increasing spread of gains or losses. Even if the
receptor is neutral toward risk, the damages he realizes are in fact only
the present representation of a position he took in the past in response
to various sets of what had been expected air pollution dosages. The
receptor's damages are generated not only by the sheer presence of a
realized pollution dosage but also by the desirability of being prepared
to realize any one of several alternative dosages. Flexibility is costly
since only one dosage will ultimately be realized at any future point
in time. Thus, unpredictable air pollution events as well as air pollution
events per se can impose costs.
Where substantial uncertainty is present, the initial bearer of risk can
often, at a price, shift his burden to those having a comparative ad-
vantage in risk-bearing. The initial bearer can therefore exchange
the perhaps small probability of a large loss for the near certainty of a
small loss. The established market prices or risk premiums for insur-
ance or contingent claims serve to establish a consensus of expectations
about the values of dated assets. The exchange process implies that
for the last contingent claim unit exchanged, expectations about future
asset values are identical among individuals. However, there seem to
be no important real world examples of insurance or contingent claims
markets unique to air pollution events. The non-existence of a mar-
ket implies the non-existence of opportunities for the transfer of air
pollution risks. Accordingly, while there are potential exchanges or
gains from trade that would improve everybody's position, they are
not currently being used to advantage. Thus, different individuals be-
30. Uncertainty and risk are treated as synonyms in this paper.
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have as if they face different prices for the same good. This failure to
exploit available gains from trade involves an economic loss funda-
mentally no different than the economic loss involved in readily ob-
servable physical air pollution damages. The loss in the case in ques-
tion again is due not to the air pollution events themselves, but to the
unpredictability of these events.
Perhaps the incentive effects of uncertainty upon emitter and recep-
tor behavior are most apparent in the emissions policing problems as-
sociated with the optimal effluent charge or standard. To an agency,
the discovery of emissions and the stated end of minimizing the sum of
receptor damage and emitter control costs can be tasks which are not
only contradictory but also repugnant. In particular, the fewer emis-
sions the control agency actually registers and acts upon the easier is
its task, but the price attached to each detected emission in order to
attain a given level of total emissions must be greater. From the
emitter's point of view, the effective price or cost of a given emission
unit is the cost of being caught multiplied by the probability of being
caught.
If control agency detection and enforcement is less than perfect, the
means available to the emitter for reducing the costs of his emissions
consist of both finding ways to avoid detection and enforcement as
well as actually reducing his emissions. If the price of emissions to
those who are unfortunate enough to be detected and penalized is
set at that value which minimizes the sum of damage and control
costs under perfect detection and enforcement, then the total actual
emissions will obviously be greater than the total that minimizes the
aforementioned sum. This, of course, assumes that emissions vary
directly with the effective cost of emitting. Furthermore, because the
effective cost to emitters is actually less than the stated price, the emission
increase caused by an increase in control costs will be greater than under
perfect detection and enforcement and the emission reduction caused
by a decrease in control costs will be less.
Should the probability of detection and enforcement be known, the
effective cost to emitters can be increased and the cost minimizing level
of total emissions can be attained by simply increasing the penalty ex-
acted from those who are detected. However, if relative prices of de-
tection avoidance possibilities differ among emitters, this control agency
maneuver would simply serve to increase the difference in effective emis-
sion costs between those emitters for whom "cheating" is costly and
those for whom it is inexpensive. The effect of a maneuver upon dif-
ferences in receptor damages would be similar.
[Vol. 5
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In summary, when cheating is possible there is no a priori reason
whatsoever why the distribution or the magnitude of damage and con-
trol costs among individual receptors and emitters or between the classes
of receptors and emitters should be identical to that under conditions
where no cheating occurs. The level of policing and enforcement ef-
fort can therefore have a substantial impact upon the de facto distribu-
tion of rights to the atmosphere's use and upon the sum of damage
and control costs associated with any emission level, including that
level which minimizes the sum of damage and control costs under
perfect detection and enforcement. Therefore, if detection and en-
forcement have never been and will never be perfect, how is the opti-
mal pollution level to be determined? Observation of that which has
never occurred requires some rules for distinguishing acceptable from
unacceptable fictions or "intellectual dodges."
IV. ANOTHER APPROACH
Discrimination between acceptable and unacceptable fictions is aided
when the decision criterion for selecting control instruments is changed.
If the fictions employed by the control agency to reduce its ICP costs
are not communicated to receptors and emitters and if these fictions
can be changed at the control agency's convenience,31 agency attempts
to minimize the sum of damage and control costs could well augment
emitter and receptor ICP costs and aggravate the uncertainty to which
these costs give rise.32 The preceding two sections have revealed that
the uncertainty borne by emitters and receptors is in part determined by
the control instrument and the fictions which the control agency chooses
31. In calculating an "optimal" value for an effluent charge or emission standard,
"fictions" that would increase the simplicity and surveyability of the data the agency
works with would play an important part. This data simplification can be accomplished
in two ways: (1) by neglecting certain relevant characteristics and relations, and (2)
by aggregating over characteristics or over discrete groupings of a single characteristic
common to several individuals. The dangers of neglect are obvious. The conditions
under which grouping and aggregation can be validly used are stringent indeed.
For a rigorous presentation of these conditions see H. GREEN, AGREGATION IN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1964). It seems likely that the lesser the degree of competence of
the control agency in atmospheric, biological, engineering, and econom;c analysis, the
greater will be its willingness to neglect and aggregate characteristics. This introduces
the question of how to check, if checking is possible, the validity of the agency's control
and damage cost estimates.
32. This is not meant to imply that ICP costs are the source of all uncertainty.
The world does seem to possess some irreducible indeterminancy. Its presence only
serves to make more tenuous the grounds on which the use of optimal effluent
charges and emission standards are customarily justified.
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to use.3 3 An alternative decision criterion can make the problem of
choosing among alternative fictions explicit.
If one makes the not unreasonable assumption that outlays on in-
formation, contracting and policing vary with the nature of the fictions
used, then only a decision criterion accounting for damage, control
and ICP costs can minimize the value of the resources consumed by
air pollution and air pollution control. One then asks: Which combi-
nations of fictions and control instruments will fulfill this objective?
The advantage of the criterion raised by this question is that it ex-
plicitly introduces the ICP costs of a wide variety of control instru-
ments into the decision-maker's problem.
It cannot be denied that a decision-maker who employes a decision
criterion minimizing only the sum of damage and control costs recog-
nizes at least his own ICP costs. That is, he at least recognizes that
the efforts to minimize the sum of damage and control costs will con-
sume some of his own budget. If the opportunity cost of meeting the
budget constraint is "too great", he is likely to consider another con-
trol instrument or perhaps employ the same instrument with lesser pre-
cision. However, this approach bespeaks of some very poorly defined
subjective judgments concerning what constitutes the opportunity costs
of staying within one's budget. Furthermore, the approach is unlikely
to give an incentive for the consideration of many alternative control in-
struments. All instruments or values of instruments that minimize the
sum of damage and control costs and that can be afforded become
equally acceptable. Some further criterion must be introduced for
choosing among these equally acceptable instruments.
Finally, if the ICP costs of receptors and emitters cannot be included
in the costs to be minimized or in the budget constraint, then, if they
are to matter at all, they must somehow be introduced as separate
constraints. This requires some premonition as to which levels of re-
ceptor and emitter ICP costs are acceptable and which are unaccept-
able. All this accomplishes, however, is the introduction of yet another
problem, the solution of which would likely require the evaluation of
another set of fictions.
One fiction which air pollution control administrators have widely
adopted is the fanciful concept that there exists an indomitably unique
concentration of pollutants in the ambient air. This once-and-for-all
choice is generally justified through appeals to the existing literature
33. See note 31 supra for a discussion of two fictions commonly used.
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dealing with the detrimental effects of pollutants upon creatures and
artifacts. It is therefore relatively effortless to establish. Its use can
be readily justified on economic grounds if there exist substantial dis-
crepancies in emitter and receptor comprehension, perception and ex-
pectation of damage and control costs. Fundamentally, the greater
these discrepancies are, the less the total value of receptor input and
emitter output will be, and the more likely that any arbitrarily, and
therefore effortlessly, selected upper bound for pollutant concentra-
tions will serve to increase the total value.3 4
The ability of a control agency to specify and enforce an ambient
air standard implies that some legally constituted executive and/or leg-
islative body has seen fit to vest the property rights in the atmosphere
in the control agency. The agencies have generally chosen to allocate
the selected waste disposal capacity by means of negotiated effluent
standards. Economists have often urged that (negotiated) effluent
charges be employed instead. In both cases, the agency ideally is sup-
posed to act from the perspective of each and every emitter and re-
ceptor in a state where ICP costs are presumed negligible. There ex-
ists at least one other alternative: the agency could define emission
"rights" and put them up for sale on a competitive bidding basis.35
These emission rights would be defined in terms of allowable emis-
sion quantities conditioned upon the assumption of specified values or
ranges of values by meteorological, temporal and spatial parameters
that are presumed to be relevant. For example, a right might state
the quantity of sulfur compounds that can be released in the early
morning hours when the wind is predominantly from the northwest
quadrant at an hourly arithmetic mean velocity of no less than fifteen
miles an hour with an adiabatic lapse rate no less than one at a spec-
34. Formal proof of this statement is available in T. CROCKER, SOME ECONOMICS
OF Am POLLUTION CONTROL 316-321 (1968) (a report to the U.S. Public Health
Service); S. TISDELL, THE THEORY OF PRICE UNCERTAINTY, PRODUCTION, AND PROFIT
151-171 (1968). The fundamental notion is simple enough: the greater the dif-
ferences in prices faced by different individuals for exactly the same good, the
greater is the likelihood that any arbitrarily selected price which is identical for all
parties will increase the total value of output. For an elementary presentation of the
reasons why such price discrepancies imply losses of potential valuable output, see
T. CROCKER & A. ROGERS 1m, ENvIRONmENTAL EcONOMICs 54-73 (1971).
35. Proposals for the establishment of explicit property rights in environmental
waste disposal capacities are not new. Such a proposal was propounded in
Crocker, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in THnE ECONOMICs
OF Am POLLUTION 61-86 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966). See also J. DALEs, POLLUTION,
PROPERTY, AND PRIcEs (1968).
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ified location. 6 If all this is too complex and costly to define, and
if causal empiricism has noted an association between the number of
times a butterfly flaps its wings and the ambient air's pollution con-
centration several hours later, then the agency could define the emis-
sion rights in terms of butterfly wing flapping. A price would be es-
tablished just as a price is established in any other market. The
scheme is informationally decentralized and is capable of dealing with
large numbers of emitters and receptors at small cost since the agency
would not have to specify the behavior patterns of individual emitters
and receptors. Furthermore, the evaluative and regulatory lag prob-
lem implicit in the effluent standard and charge approaches would be
ameliorated. Rather than having adjustments take place after new
emissions occur, the bidding process means that the new would-be
emitter must purchase the emission immediately prior to undertaking
emissions.
However, such a bidding scheme also has severe problems which
make its relative advantages somewhat less clear. In particular, all
of the previously mentioned receptor informational and contractual cost
problems would continue to be present and, if the agency performed
no policing, any receptors who did purchase rights would face severe
policing problems.
Consider in partial contrast the following scheme. After an ambi-
ent air standard whose attributes are defined in terms of a simulated
diffusion model is established, emission rights defined in terms of al-
lowable emissions relative to the values assumed by the model's me-
teorological and topographic parameters could be put up for competi-
tive bidding. If considered desirable, the ambient standard could
differ from area to area within a city, but within any one area it
would not be subject to any change whatsoever except at regular in-
tervals of substantial duration. Rights would be alienable among
36. There now exist several sophisticated mathematized simulation models of the
meteorological transport and diffusion process. Each of these models employs essen-
tially the same parameters, but in a different manner or time-scale. Fundamentally, all
describe the spatial and temporal frequency distributions of pollutant dosages and dura-
tions from various patterns of emissions sources operating under diverse meteorological
and topographical conditions. When programmed for simulations, the models' para-
meters can be manipulated in a variety of ways to predict the effects of parameter
changes upon dispersion patterns. For representative examples of these models see
Turner, A Diffusion Model for an Urban Area, 3 J. APPLIED METEOROLOGY 83 (1964);
Miller & Holzworth, An Atmospheric Diffusion Model for Metropolitan Areas, 17 J.
AM POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 46 (1967); Koogler, et. aL., A Multivariable
Model for Atmospheric Dispersion Predictions, 17 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS'N
211 (1967).
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all economic agents and from one location to another. However, any
transfer could not result in the ambient standard in that location be-
ing exceeded. Thus, the only situation in which a locational transfer
could occur would be when an unused assimilative and dispersion ca-
pacity at the new location existed. The atmospheric property rights
established with this approach would therefore consist of a set of lo-
cationally defined time-state emission claims having probabilities as-
sociated with each state and discounts associated with each future.
Assume, for simplicity, that there is a fabrication of a uniform am-
bient air standard and a normalized emission right. The number of
rights available to an area therefore would be positively related to the
area's dilution and assimilation capacity and, for a given demand over
all areas, the price of a right would vary inversely with an area's dilu-
tion and assimilation capacity. Those to whom the net benefits of emis-
sion are greatest thus would tend to locate in areas having the higher
capacities.
The preceding approach closely resembles a zoning scheme in which
the atmosphere's dilution and assimilative capacity is the criterion. All
the scheme does is specify a range of acceptable use conditions within
which the market is to be permitted to arrive at a maximal solution.
The ambient standard specifies the maximum rate for waste disposal
purposes at which the air input is to be substituted for non-air inputs.
Receptors and emitters must then adjust to this rate. The prices for
emission rights will contain sufficient information to negate the bene-
fit for the individual agent of knowing directly what other agents are
doing. All of the information which would otherwise have to be dis-
covered and analyzed is embodied in the market price of the emission
right. Since each economic agent can make his own adjustment to the
existing market for rights, a wide variety of differences among individ-
ual receptors and emitters can be accommodated. The effect is the
same as spatially separating the two groups so that their use decisions
can be made independently of each other. Once the standard is es-
tablished, control agency information on abatement or damage costs
is not required. The agency's function would be to police and enforce
property rights. In direct contrast to the effluent charge, continuous
and expensive monitoring of each emitter in order to determine the to-
tal charge he must pay would not be necessary. Random spot checks
similar in nature to any other policing function would serve to inhibit
most property right violations.
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Perhaps the most important feature of the scheme is that the am-
bient standard introduces certainty about maximum levels of emissions
and air pollution dosages. The mutual compatibility of expectations
among individual receptors and emitters and between the classes of re-
ceptors and emitters means that a major cause of price discrepancies is
removed. Receptors are not required to employ inputs of relatively
high flexibility in order to be prepared for air pollution contingencies
which are ultimately unrealized. If we assume that emitters can pre-
dict the price of emission rights with greater accuracy than they can
the whims of a control agency, emitter as well as receptor uncertainty
would be in fact reduced. The scheme recognizes the existence of a
trade-off between the reduction of uncertainty and that minimization
of the sum of damage and control costs which occurs in a fictitious,
and even whimsical, negligible ICP cost world institutionally con-
strained by nothing other than a fee simple absolute system of property
rights." The key point is that there may be more to be gained for
the moment in environmental quality management by reducing un-
certainty than by searching for some presently ill-defined and rather
unapproachable optimum. Though it is apparent that ICP costs are an
important part of the system that determines this optimum, very little
is now known about these costs' theoretical properties or their empirical
behavior under various control strategies.
The competitive bidding feature is really the only thing which dis-
tinguishes the scheme set forth herein from a sophisticated meteorolog-
ical zoning scheme. This feature, in addition to providing the control
agency with at least some of the funds to carry out its policing and
enforcement functions, means that holders of emission rights are con-
tributing to the costs of policing and enforcing these rights. Under
any straightforward zoning scheme, these funds, if they are to be de-
rived from the air resource's use, would have to be obtained through a
property tax. In order to remain allocatively neutral, this tax would
have to be strictly proportional across sites to the capitalized value of
the emission right embedded in the site. Assessments of this determina-
tion's accuracy, if achieved at all, could be achieved only at great ex-
pense.
37. This is not meant to imply that accepted economic theory does not rigorously
deal with questions of uncertainty. It does. However, among other conditions, the
existence of a market for contingent contracts is required. In contrast, many en-
vironmental quality problems appear to be characterized by high ICP costs inhibiting
the use of the market as the sole allocation instrument.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Obviously, the zoning scheme set forth herein is not a universal
panacea. This paper's main purpose has been to argue that controls,
in addition to effluent charges or standards, are required in air pollu-
tion control programs if the sum of abatement, damage and ICP costs
is to be minimized. A procedure in which a control agency makes
invariant and known use decisions to last for a fixed period of time
while the market then allocates the air resource among users appears
to have several economically desirable properties. Only recently have
economists begun to take more than passing notice of the obvious fact
that all aspects of voluntary exchanges are not embodied in explicit
pecuniary measuresY8 That is, the value of all that is exchanged is
not always collapsed into the exchange price. Typically, where alter-
native future states of nature will have substantial impact upon an
asset's value and where the determination of the probability of these
states' occurrences is subject to relatively high ICP costs for buyers
and sellers, private exchange terms will include a wide variety of both
conditional and absolute stipulations. It seems rather farfetched to
assert that a regulatory body can perform efficiently without using
anything other than a price as represented by an effluent charge or
standard, particularly when private markets are unable to do so for a
substantial portion of the time. Nonpecuniary controls, to the extent
that they reduce emitter and receptor ICP costs, can cause a hereto-
fore non-existent market to come into being. In short, it is not true
that such controls always inhibit the operation of markets. They can
also create markets.
38. See Cheung, Transactions Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual
Arrangements, 12 J. LAw & ECON. 23 (1969) wherein the author presents an analysis
of Chinese agricultural leasing arrangements.
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